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DEFUNIS, DEFUNCT 
Jim Chen* 
November 1998 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the Supreme Court's initial decision to accept a case pre-
senting the question of race-conscious university admis-
sions. This silver jubilee merits three cheers1 for DeFunis v. 
Odegaartf-and a moment of silence upon its passing. Call 
it three ovations and a funeral. 
Marco DeFunis, Jr., was initially denied admission to 
the 1974 class of the University of Washington Law School. 
Like many other law schools, Washington gave presump-
tive weight to an index based on undergraduate grades and 
LSAT scores.3 The school's admissions procedures pro-
vided, however, that "all files of 'minority' applicants"-
defined as "Black Americans, Chicano Americans, 
American Indians and Philippine Americans," but not 
other Asian Americans-be "considered by the full 
[admissions] committee" without regard to an individual 
applicant's grades or scores.4 Upon finding that the 
minority admissions program resulted in the admission of 
students less qualified than DeFunis, the King County 
Superior Court ordered his admission to the class entering 
in September 1971.5 
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. It held, 
first, "that the consideration of race as a factor in the ad-
missions policy of a state law school is not a per se violation 
of the equal protection clause."6 Rejecting the argument 
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1. That's one more cheer for DeFunis than the Chief Justice who oversaw the de-
cision. See Daniel A. Farber, Two Cheers for Warren Burger, 4 Const. Comm. 1 (1987). 
2. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), granting cert to 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). 
3. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Wash. 1973) (footnote omitted), va-
cated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
4. ld at 1174. 
5. See id at 1176-77. 
6. Id at 1181. 
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that the racial classification at work "should be considered 
'benign,"' the court required "the law school to show that 
its consideration of race in admitting students is necessary 
to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest."7 In 
the end, however, the court upheld the minority admissions 
program, fearing that a contrary decision might "perpetu-
ate[j indefinitely" the law school's state of "minority un-
derrepresentation. "8 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 
19, 1973.9 The threat to educational affirmative action was 
palpable. According to one journalistic account, "all nine 
Justices leaned [initially] toward holding that ... fixed ra-
cial quotas" in university admissions "were unconstitu-
tional."10 Even Justice Marshall feared that "uphold[ing] 
[a] fixed quota for minorities might create an unfortunate 
precedent which could be used eventually to exclude mi-
norities."11 Another account reports that the Justices were 
deeply divided and that Justice Brennan had amassed four 
votes to permit some consideration of race in university 
admissions.12 A showdown over affirmative action seemed 
unavoidable; neither the parties' briefs nor those of twenty-
six sets of amici identified a serious jurisdictional defect in 
the case. 13 
The Court eventually decided the case on mootness 
grounds. DeFunis had all but finished his studies, and the 
law school asserted that not even an adverse decision 
would prevent his graduation.14 What had begun as a de-
bate among the Justices on the merits of affirmative action 
turned into a jurisdictional battle.15 The original and the 
"strongest" proponent "of the mootness approach," 1" Jus-
tice Stewart "offered to write a per curiam declaring the 
7. ld at 1182. 
8. ld at 1184. 
9. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), granting cert. to 507 P.2d 1169 
(Wash. 1973). 
10. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 
282 (Simon and Schuster, 1979). 
11. Id. 
12. See Bernard Schwartz, Behind Bakke: Affirmative Action and the Supreme 
Court 33 (New York U. Press, 1988). 
13. See Louis H. Pollack, DeFunis Non Est Disputandum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 495, 
498 (1975). 
14. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,317-19 (1974). 
15. See Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12). 
16. ld. 
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case moot."17 As President Nixon's four appointees-the 
Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist-acquiesced in this compromise, "[e]ven the 
liberals breathed a sigh of relief that the case was gone. "18 
(Relieved though they might have been, the liberals took 
pains to protest the mootness decision.t 
On April 23, 1974, the Court vacated the judgment 
below and remanded the case to the state supreme court.20 
On remand a fractured Washington Supreme Court denied 
DeFunis's motion to designate the case a class action21 and 
instead reinstated its original judgment.22 A few interested 
observers took quiet pleasure in how the case ended not 
with a bang but a whimper.23 
A mere four years later, the Bakke decision24 fulfilled 
the DeFunis dissenters' prediction that educational af-
firmative action would "inevitably return" to the Court.25 
Whereas DeFunis had allowed an aggrieved white student 
to graduate without addressing the merits of affirmative ac-
tion, Bakke approved race-conscious admissions in the 
name of "diversity" even as it ordered its plaintiff admitted 
to his chosen university. Although the Court has never re-
visited the question of affirmative action in a university set-
ting,26 an entire generation of legal commentators has de-
voted more attention to Bakke than perhaps any other 
Supreme Court decision.27 
17. Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren at 282 (cited in note 10). 
18. Id 
19. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 348 (Brennan, J., 
joined by Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
20. See id. at 320 (per curiam). 
21. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 529 P.2d 438, 441-42 (Wash. 1974); cf. United States 
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,404 (1980) ("[A]n action brought on behalf of 
a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim, 
even though class certification has been denied."); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 
(1975) ("[A] controversy may exist ... between a named defendant and a member of the 
class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has 
become moot."). 
22. See De Funis, 529 P.2d at 444-45. 
23. See Pollak, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 495 (cited in note 13). 
24. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
25. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
26. See, e.g., Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), denying cert. to 78 F.3d 932 
(5th Cir. 1996); Kirwan v. Podberesky, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995), denying cert. to 38 F.3d 147 
(4th Cir. 1994); cf. Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (1996) ("(T]he ... Court has said a lot about contracting and rather 
little about education."). 
27. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory 
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Over the past two decades, DeFunis has gotten lost in 
the constitutional cascade that followed Bakke. Legal 
scholars have obsessed over the affirmative action guide-
lines outlined in Bakke and ignored the Court's close call in 
DeFunis. Such are the perils of an academic tradition that 
favors grand theory over less glamorous questions of prac-
tice, procedure, and pragmatic consequences.28 Then again, 
to the extent that Bakke is "the Kama Sutra of educational 
affirmative action,"29 why would-or should-scholars 
waste any time on the relatively pedestrian decision in De-
Funis? Understandable though the preference for Bakke 
over DeFunis might be, it has blinded us to three notewor-
thy aspects of the DeFunis decision. A single word ex-
presses each of these: mootness, Realpolitik, and honesty. 
Althou9oh DeFunis is regarded as a paragon of the pas-
sive virtues, the sheer complexity of its relationship with 
mootness doctrine prevents us from treating it as a clear 
triumph of jurisdiction over substance. With the passage of 
time, DeFunis has taken its place in mootness doctrine as a 
case of relatively modest stature. The Court conceded that 
the law school's "voluntary cessation of [its] admissions 
procedures"31 would not moot the case, a position well 
grounded in prior and later cases.32 DeFunis does appear, 
especially when viewed in conjunction with a 1973 case 
raising issues of mootness,33 to have represented a transi-
and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 906 (1998) ("What a colossal 
waste this fixation has been"); Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147, 159-60 (1994) (describing the act of reading legal scholarship 
on affirmative action as "a depressing experience"). 
28. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 Chi. Kent L. 
Rev. 953, 958 (1997) (noting that scholarship in administrative law, which is increasingly 
concerned with questions of "how best to regulate," looks "less like legal scholarship" 
(emphasis in original)). 
29. Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 1123, 1127 (1997). 
30. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 Co-
lum. L. Rev. 512,512-13 (1975); Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on 
the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 
911-16 (1983) (arguing that the Court intentionally avoided deciding DeFunis on its mer-
its in order to shield affirmative action programs from direct attack); cf. Bernard 
Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action 45 (Addison-Wesley, 
1990) (using DeFunis to describe mootness doctrine and to locate the doctrine's role in 
"Burger Court jurisprudence"). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Danger-
ous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 115-98 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
31. De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974). 
32. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (1980); United States v. W. T. Grant 
Co., 345 U.S. 629,632 (1953). 
33. Compare DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318-19 (declining to treat the question raised by 
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tion in the Court's thinking on cases "capable of repetition, 
yet evading review." Earlier cases waived mootness objec-
tions whenever the defendant's alleged misconduct might 
harm any member of the public.34 Later cases insisted, in 
accordance with DeFunis and Roe v. Wade,35 that the recur-
ring injury befall the plaintift_3" Finally, the Court's chosen 
remedy in DeFunis-a decision to vacate and to remand 
for further proceedings in state coure-has since fallen out 
of favor. The Court now prefers to dismiss cases that be-
come moot while on review from a state court, thereby pre-
serving the underlying state court judgment.38 This out-
come in DeFunis, which was open to the Justices, might 
have transmitted a different message to the public. 
In an age in which defensive settlement of a dreaded 
Supreme Court case has become a leading civil rights strat-
egy,39 DeFunis aptly symbolizes the subtle subversiveness of 
the passive virtues. This much remains constant: the pas-
sive virtues of judicial avoidance cannot forever forestall 
the a~gressive vices of academic debate. Like Nairn v. 
Nairn before it, DeFunis could delay but not defuse an ex-
plosive racial controversy.41 Even if Bakke had never come 
along, DeFunis had already sparked the powder keg. No 
matter what the Justices would do later, DeFunis put af-
firmative action on the docket in the court of legal com-
mentary. Nothing, after all, stops professors from writing 
DeFunis as one "capable of repetition, yet evading review") (quoting Southern Pacific 
Terminal v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) 
(applying this exception to mootness doctrine in order to review a challenge to a statute 
banning abortion). See also Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12) (reporting 
that Justice Stewart distinguished DeFunis from Roe on mootness grounds during the 
Justices' conference on DeFunis). See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973). 
34. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 
(1911 ). 
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
36. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 546-57 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S 147, 149 (1975). 
37. See 416 U.S. at 320. 
38. See ASARCO Inc.~·. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,621 n.l (1989). 
39. See Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997), vacating as moot 
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). 
40. 350 u.s. 985 (1956). 
41. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1839, 1855 (1996) 
C'Just as the Court ducked the miscegenation issue in Nairn v. Nairn, it evaded the ques-
tiOn of preferential university admissions in De Funis v. Odegaard." (footnotes omitted)). 
The Court, of course, invalidated laws against interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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about a topic that the Supreme Court has chosen to duck. 
The case attracted two preeminent legal scholars, John 
Hart Ely42 and Richard A. Posner,43 whose reactions to De-
Funis arguably exhausted all available arguments in the af-
firmative action debate before it began. There was a time, 
remote though it may seem now, when DeFunis alone 
fueled the affirmative action debate.44 It is true that many 
a scholar "desperate for a topic for a tenure piece "45 - or 
even a topic for a job talk-has fallen into the trap of writ-
ing on affirmative action. Mere repetition, however, ex-
punges none of the lethal qualities of a siren song. No one 
should write on educational affirmative action who cannot 
first demonstrate that he or she can augment the arguments 
adduced so long ago by Ely and Posner.46 
The fourth Justice among DeFunis's dissenters gives us 
a second reason to laud the case. Ely and Posner did not 
stand alone in reaching the merits underlying DeFunis; Jus-
tice Douglas joined them. He succinctly articulated what 
has become the standard attack on educational affirmative 
action: an applicant for admission to a public university has 
"a constitutional right to have his application considered 
on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner."47 
Progressives today often condemn Justice Douglas's 
DeFunis dissent as an "angry" and "vehement" attack on 
affirmative action.48 But these critics rarely acknowledge 
the depth of Justice Douglas's ambivalence about the sub-
ject. During the conference on DeFunis, Justice Douglas's 
"typically maverick view[s]" emerged; in one breath he 
criticized both race-conscious admissions and the use of 
42. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974). 
43. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential 
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 1. 
44. See generally Robert M. O'Nei~ Discriminating Against Discrimination: Prefer· 
entia/ Admissions and the DeFunis Case (Indiana U. Press, 1975); Ivor Kraft, DeFunis v. 
Odegaard: Race, Merit, and the Fourteenth Amendment (Uncommon Lawyers Workshop, 
1976); DeFunis Symposium, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 483 (1975). 
45. Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 Const. Comm. 307, 
309 n.9 (1986). 
46. As with all other articles "present[ing] ... a meta-theory about [legal] scholar-
ship," this "Article's thesis ... does not apply to itself." Daniel A. Farber, The Case 
Against Brilliance, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 917, 930 n.56 (1986). 
47. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
48. E.g., Michael A. Olivas, Legal Norms in Law School Admissions: An Essay on 
Parallel Universes, 42 J. Legal Educ. 103, 109 n.35 (1992). 
1999] DEFUNIS, DEFUNCT 97 
standardized tests.49 Before the Court settled on its moot-
ness resolution, he evidently "circulated an opinion ruling 
out affirmative action, withdrew it the next day, and then 
substituted a draft saying that race could be taken into ac-
count."50 In the opinion he actually published, Justice 
Douglas advocated considerable "leeway" for admissions 
officers who rendered "educational decision( s]" according 
to "proper guidelines."51 He thus foreshadowed the "plus 
factor" approach that would eventually prevail in Bakke,52 
without succumbing to the fiction that a putatively flexible 
preference policy would operate any differently than quo-
tas.53 His proposals to abolish the LSA T' and to administer 
direct tests of an apRlicant's propensity to work in under-
served communities 5 resonate with many contemporary 
proposals for reform.56 Like President Clinton after him, 
Justice Douglas ultimately decided to try mending affirma-
tive action without ending it.57 
A decade before DeFunis, Justice Douglas had sig-
naled his hostility to race-conscious measures in a voting 
49. Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12). 
50. Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren at 282 (cited in note 10). 
51. De Funis, 416 U.S. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
52. See id at 340-41 ("There is ... no bar to considering an individual's prior 
achievements in light of the racial discrimination that barred his way, as a factor in at-
tempting to assess his true potential for a successful ... career."); cf. Larry M. Lavinsky, 
The Affirmative Action Trilogy and Benign Racial Classifications-Evolving Law in Need 
of Standards, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 7 (1980) (describing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 
as "reminiscent of the Douglas dissent in De Funis"). 
53. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 332-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kent Greenawalt, Ju-
dicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. 
Rev. 559, 560-61 (1975); cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978) 
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that there is no material difference between a fixed quota and a 
"plus factor" approach, except that the fixed quota is more obvious and honest). 
54. See De Funis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
55. See id at 341. 
56. Cf Larry M. Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with a Mes-
sage, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 520,533 (1975) ("Justice Douglas has sought to shift the focus of 
the selection process from racial preference and quotas towards one in which the educa-
tionally, culturally and economically disadvantaged, no less than other applicants, are 
afforded an opportunity for admission commensurate with their ability and potential."); 
Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of 
America Denying the Impact of Race, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1089, 1115 (1993) ("Justice 
Douglas's De Funis opinion appears to be the genesis of the concept of basing affirmative 
action on socio-economic factors, rather than race."). See generally Richard D. Kahlen-
berg, The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action (BasicBooks, 1996) (proposing 
class-based affirmative action as a substitute for the race-based variant). 
57. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I cannot conclude that 
the admissions procedure of the Law School of the University of Washington ... is viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
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rights case made obscure by the passage of time. Justice 
Douglas's dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller's posited that 
"government has no business designing electoral districts 
along racial ... lines" under any circumstances.59 He an-
ticipated and squarely rejected the "benign intent" argu-
ment invoked in later affirmative action cases.60 He surely 
would have mocked the "separate but better off' theory 
that motivates minority student housing and other racially 
exclusive measures in many universities today.6' The seeds 
that Justice Douglas planted in Wright would bloom three 
decades later in the astonishing flurry of voting rights deci-
sions beginning with Shaw v. Reno.62 Quite significantly, 
Justice Goldberg joined Justice Douglas in Wrighf3 and 
wrote a separate dissent that Justice Douglas joined in 
turn.64 In this alliance between two of the Warren Court's 
leading liberals lurked the kernel of two divisive debates-
affirmative action and race-conscious redistricting-that 
would eventually split the heirs of the civil rights move-
ment65 and the Democratic Party.66 Scholars are only be-
ginning to realize the true instability of the disparate racial, 
gender-based, and economic components of the modern 
progressive coalition.67 
We ought not be surprised that DeFunis, Wright, and 
attitudes about official race-consciousness have all come 
full circle during the span of a single human generation. 
Twenty-five years is a relatively long time for the Supreme 
Court to complete a constitutional hiccough. Hammer v. 
Dagenhart,68 Wolf v. Colorado,69 and National League of 
58. 376 u.s. 52 (1964). 
59. Id at 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
60. Compare id at 61 ("Racial segregation that is state-sponsored should be nulli-
fied whatever may have been intended." (emphasis added)) with Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (subjecting "benign race-conscious measures man-
dated by Congress" to intermediate rather than strict judicial scrutiny). 
61. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
62. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 
512 u.s. 997 (1994). 
63. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
64. See id at 67 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
65. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative 
Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1327-28 (1986). 
66. See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 Cal. 
L. Rev. 893,897-98 (1994). 
67. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abonion, 
Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731 (1997). 
68. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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Cities v. Userl0 all retreated into bad legal memory in less 
time. Metro Broadcasting, the most aggressive of the 
Court's affirmative action decisions, died after a mere five 
years.71 If indeed "[o]ur Constitution is a covenant running 
from" generation to generation, "[ e ]ach generation must 
[reject] anew ... ideas and aspirations" not fit to "survive 
more ages than one."72 
Honesty, a rare commodity in the affirmative action 
debate/3 is the third and final reason to revere DeFunis. 
The University of Washington confessed at oral argument 
that none of the students who benefited from its law 
school's minority admissions program "would have been 
admitted" had their applications been "considered under 
the same procedure as was generally used."74 For much of 
the next quarter century, universities would abandon the 
candor that characterized the University of Washington's 
defense in DeFunis. Georgetown University swiftly pun-
ished a student who had the audacity to report the truth 
about its law school admissions office.75 Violent debates 
turn on the extent to which racial considerations affect ad-
missions decisions.76 Only slowly has the American aca-
demic establishment come to confess its dependence on af-
firmative action in ensuring more than token numbers of 
black, Hispanic, and American Indian students.n 
The academy's addiction to affirmative action may be 
coming to an abrupt end. On November 3, 1998, nearly a 
69. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
70. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
71. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); cf. Neil Devins, Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1990) (pre-
dicting accurately that Metro Broadcasting was the most doctrinally unstable of the Su-
preme Court's affirmative action decisions). 
72 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,901 (1992). 
73. See Farber, 82 Cal. L. Rev. at 933 (cited in note 66). 
74. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
75. See Michel Marriott, White Accuses Georgetown Law School of Bias in Admit-
ting Blacks, N.Y. Times A13 (Apr. 15, 1991) 
76. Compare Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School 
Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1997) with Stephan Themstrom, Dh·ersity 
and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The 
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education, "15 Const. Comm. 11 (1998). 
77. See William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term 
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton U. 
Press, 1998). 
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quarter century after the grant of certiorari in DeFunis, 
Washington voters approved Initiative 200, a referendum 
barring race- and sex-based preferences in the public sec-
tor. In response to the passage of I-200, the University of 
Washington has suspended the use of race and ethnicity in 
admissions. The university has also confessed that 88 of 
the 373 black, Hispanic, and American Indian students in 
its current freshman class would not have been admitted 
under a race-blind admissions system.78 In issuing "more 
complete published standards for admission," the Univer-
sity of Washington has finally fulfilled the wishes expressed 
by several sympathetic state judges so many years ago.79 
And so the sun sets on affirmative action at the Uni-
versity of Washington, almost twenty-five years to the day 
after the Supreme Court decided to review the practice. 
The passage of Initiative 200, especially when viewed in 
conjunction with the passage of California Initiative 209,80 
repeats the three salient themes of DeFunis: mootness (al-
beit in an informal rather than doctrinal sense), conflict be-
tween the legal theory and the political reality of official 
race-consciousness, and cold, hard honesty. In death as in 
its brief life, DeFunis merits a tribute befitting an unsung 
hero. 
78. See Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields, 
N.Y. Times A25 (Nov. 10, 1998). 
79. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (Wash. 1973) (Wright, J., joined by 
Finley & Stafford, JJ., concurring), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). . 
80. See generally Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Clr. 
1997); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Gu~~e, .44 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1335 (1997). Unlike California Initiative 209, Washington ImtlatJve 
200 carries the legal weight of a statute rather than that of an amendment to the state 
constitution. Lacking the status of fundamental law, Initiative 200 must be construed in 
pari materia with other state laws. More important, perhaps, it is vulnerable to repeal by 
ordinary legislation. 
